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in fact performed for the purpose of soliciting employment;
also, there were other facts and circumstances shown to have
been present in connection with that matter which raise a
serious do~bt as to whether the employment was in fact
solicited.
[10] In proceedings of this character where the evidence
is conflicting, as was shown to be the fact herein, the findings
of the local administrative committee and of the Board of
Bar Governors are not necessarily binding on this court.
(In re Petersen, 208 Cal. 42 [280 Pac. 124]; 9 Cal. Jur.
10.Year Supp., p. 440.) [9b] Also, in the present proceedings where it is apparent that the testimony given by each
of the principal witnesses in support of the charges in the
Proctor and Bishop matters was shown to have been in itself
not only conflicting and contradictory but colored by self·
interest and animosity, the evidence cannot be said to be of
that clear and convincing nature which is necessary to establish a finding of culpability on the part of the accused.
(Furman v. State Bar, 12 Cal. (2d) 212 [83 Pac. (2d) 12];
Bar Association of San Francisco v. Sullivan, 185 CaL 621
[198 Pac. 7].) [11] Charges of unprofessional conduct on
the part of an attorney should be sustained by convincing
proof and to a reasonable certainty, and any reasonable
doubts should be resolved in favor of the accused. (Golden
v. State Bar, 213 Cal. 237 [2 Pac. (2d) 325]; Aydelotte v.
State Bar of Oalifornia, 209 Cal. 737 [290 Pac. 41].)
There is no contention that petitioner failed to give proper
attention and care to the cases and his client's interests.
'rhe results obtained and services rendered were satisfactory.
A's hereinbefore has been indicated, it is the conclusion of
this court that none of the charges set forth in the order to
show cause was sufficiently supported by the evidence.
It, therefore, is ordered that the charges against petitioner
should be, and they are, hereby dismissed.

MOORE V. PURSE SEINE NET.

835

[L. A. No. 16192. In Bank.-Oct.20, 1941.]

E. C. :MOORE et a1., Respondents, v. PURSE SEINE' NET,
Defendant; C. J. HENDRY COMPANY (it Corporation)
et a1., Appellants.
[1] Shipping-Jurisdiction-Federal and State Oourts-OommonLaw Remedy.-Under the Judiciary Act of 1789 and the Judicial Code, 28 U. S. C. A., §§ 24 (2), 256,re-enacting it,
which provide that the federal district courts shall have exclusive original cognizance of all civil causes of admiralty
and maritime jurisdiction "saving to suitors, in all eases, the
right of a common-law remedy where the common law is
competent to give it," a case involving a niaritime cause of
action may properly be brought in the state courts. if the
remedy sought is traditionally within the jurisdiction of
common-law courts.

...

12] Id.-Jurisdiction-Federal and State Courts-Concurrent Jurisdiction.-If a cause of action involving a maritime matter
is ofa type that was cognizable in both admiralty and
common-law courts, the state courts retain a concurrent jurisdiction with the federal admiralty courts to entertain the
action. The fact that federal forfeiture statutes require that
a proceeding thereunder against a vessel· or its equipment be
brought in the federal district court sitting as a court of
admiralty does not prevent California from conferring jurisdiction upon her courts to proceed with such cases under a
California· statute if the type of action is' a traditional
common-law remedy.
[3] Common and Civil Law-Extent and Limitation of Adoption
-Written and Unwritten Law.-In Cahfornia 'the common
law of England includes not only the Zex non scripta but also
the written statutes enacted by Parliament prior to the separation of the colonies in 1776.

[4] Fish and Fisheries-Regulation-Seizure and ForfeitureJurisdiction of State Courts.-An action brought under Fish
and Game Code, § 845, to forfeit a purse seine net used to
take fish from ocean waters in violation of § 842, involves a

1. See 16 Cal. Jur. 354.
3. See 5 Cal. Jur. 252; 11 Am. Jur. 166.
McK. Dig. References: 1, 2. Shipping, § 7; 3. Common and Civil
Law, § 3; 4, 5. Fish and Fisheries, § 22; 6. Courts, § 137.
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traditional common-law remedy cognizable in the state courts
of California, even though the statute was enacted subsequent
to the JUdiciary Act which vests jurisdiction of maritime
matters in the federal district court but saves to suitors the
right of a common-law remedy where the common law is
'
competent to give it.
[5] Id. - Regulation - Seizure and Forfeiture - Petition-Suffi.ciencY.-An allegation of a petition to forfeit a purse seine
net that it is and was at all times an appliance used for the
taking of fish and was used in violation of Fish and Game
Code, § 842, constitutes a sufficient allegation that the net was
illegally used to catch fish.
[6] Courts-Transfer of Causes-Between Supreme Court and
District Court of Appeal-Effect-Jurisdiction.-Where a
judgment of forfeiture of a purse seine net pronounces the
net a public nuisance pursuant to Fish and Game Code, § 845,
the action is one to abate a nuisance and, therefore, within
the appellate jurisdiction of a District Court of Appeal, but
when the case comes to the Supreme Court upon its order
granting a hearing after decision of the District Court of
Appeal, the Supreme Court has jurisdiction for all purposes.

i~'i

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Harry R. Archbald, Judge. Affirmed.
('

Action to forfeit a purse seine net used unla wfully to
take fish in ocean waters. Judgment for plaintiffs affirmed.
Alfred T. Cluff, Sawyer & Cluff, Arch E. Ekdale and
Cluff & Bullard for Appellants.
Earl Warren, Attorney General, and Eugene M. Elson and
Paul D. McCormick, Deputies Attorney General, for Respondents.
TRAYNOR, J.-California law enforcement officers seized
a large purse seine fishing net in use on the fishing boat
"Reliance" in naviga'bie waters of the Pacific Ocean adjacent
to Catalina Island. The taking of fish by net within these
'waters is unlawful. (Fish and Game Code, sec. 842.) The
California Fish and Game Commission filed a petition in the
superior court asking for a judgment to declare the net a
public nuisance forfeited to the state, and to order its destructionor sale under the provisions of section 845 of the
Fish and Game Code. A judgment of forfeiture issued from
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which the owners of the net have appealed. They do not
challenge the power of the state to enact legislation regulating ,~
fishing within territorial waters and providing for the forfeiture of nets used in an illegal manner, but they contend
that the state court has no jurisdiction to proceed in the
action because it is a maritime cause of action within the
exclusive admiralty jurisdiction of the federal courts.
[1] Section 9 of the Judiciary Act of 17,89 and later
statutes re-enacting the same provision (Judicial Code, sees.
24 (2), 256; 28 U. S. C. A., § 41, subd. 3, § 371) provide that
the federal district courts shall have exclusive original cognizance of all civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, "saving to suitors in all cases the right of a commonlaw remedy where the common law is competent to give
it. . . . " (See The Moses Taylor, 4 Wall. 411 [18 L. Ed. ,
397].) The present proceeding involves a maritime cause
of action. If the property proceeded against is an integral'
part of the vessel or its equipment and is seized on navigable waters the cause is maritime. (Turner v. United
States, 27 Fed. (2d) 134; The Buffalo, 148 Fed. 331; The
lVitch Queen, 3 Sawy. 201 [30 Fed. Cas. 396, No. 17,916].)
This fact alone, however,does not establish that the action
is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts.,
The saving clause of the Judiciary Act makes it clear, that
a case involving a maritime cause of action may properly be
brought in a state court if the type of remedy pursued is
traditionally ,within the jurisdiction of the common ·law
courts. Even though the right to sue is created by a recently,
enacted state statute, it is within the saving clause 80 long,
as the remedy is of a type recognized at common law (Red
Gross Line v. Atlantic Fruit 00., 264 U. S. 109 [44 Sup. at.
274, 68L. Ed. 582]), including equity. (Knapp, Stoui~:
Go. v. McOaffrey, 177 U. S. 638 [20 Sup. Ot. 824, 44 L. Ed.'
921].)
,
[2] If the action is of a type that was cognizable 'in
both admiralty and common law courts the state courts retain a concurrent jurisdiction with the federal admiralty
courts to entertain the action. (Reynolds
Steamboat
Favorite, 10 Minn. (Gil. 190, 193) 242; New Jersey Steam
Nav. 00. v. Merchant's Bank, 6 How. 344, 390 [12 L. Ed.
465] ; Percival v. Hickey, 18 Johns. (N. Y.) 257 [9 Am. Dec~
210] ; 1 Kent Com. 367, 377; 1 Story, Constitution, 533.' See
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American Steamboat 00: v. Ohase, 16 Wall. 522 [21 L. Ed.
369] ; Sherlock v. Alling, 93 U. S. 99 [23 L. Ed. 819] ; Fisher
v. Boutelle Trans. &7 Towing 00., 162 Fed. 994; International
Nav. 00. v. Lindstrom, 123 Fed. 475 [60 C. C. A. 649] ; The
Harrisburg, 119 U. S. 199, 213 [7 Sup. Ct. 140, 30 L. Ed.
358]; The Hamilton, 207 U. S. 398 [28 Sup. Ct. 133, 52
L. Ed. 264] ; Aurora Shipping 00. v. Boyce, 191 Fed. 960,
966 [112 C. C. A. 372L) "The saving clause of the t.Tudiciary Act and of the Judicial Code does not contemplate
admiralty remedies in a common law court. Its meaning is
that in cases of concurrent jurisdiction in admiralty and at
common law, the jurisdiction in the latter is not taken away."
(Benedict, Admiralty (5th ed.), sec. 23. See Knapp, Stout
&. 00. v. McOaffrey, supra; Red Oross Line v. Atlantic Fruit
00., supra.) The fact that federal forfeiture statutes, similar
to that of California, require that a proceeding thereunder
against a vessel or its equipment be brought in a federal
district court sitting as a court of admiralty (see The Sarah,
8 Wheat .. 391 [5 L. Ed. 644] ; United States v. The Betsy and
Oharlotte, 4 Cranch 443 [2 L. Ed. 673]; The Oonfiscation
Oases, 7 Wall.· 454 [19 L. Ed. 196]; United States v. La
Vengeance, 3 Dall. 297 [1 L. Ed. 610]; United States v.
Gr'll/ndy, 3 Cranch 337 [2 L. Ed. 459]; The Palmyra, 12
-;tTheat. 1 [6 L. Ed. 531]), does not prevent California from
conferring jurisdiction upon her courts to proceed with such
cases under a California statute if the type of action is a
traditional common law remedy.
It is therefore necessary to determine whether this forfeiture proceeding by the state is the type of action that
was cognizable in a common law court. In 1789 when the
Judiciary Act was enacted there had been little development
of the common law in federal or state courts of the United
States. An examination of the English common law as it
existed before that time must therefore be made.
[3] In determining the jurisdiction of the English common law courts, acts of Parliament defining that jurisdiction
must be taken into account. It is well established in California that the common law of England includes not only
the lex non scripta but also the written statutes enacted by
Parliament. (Martin v. Superior Oourt, 176 Cal. 289 [168
Pac. 135, L. R. A. 1918B, 313] ; People v. Richardson, 138
Cal. App. 404 [32 Pac. (2d) 433].) Other jurisdictions are
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in accord with this view, most of them holding that English
statutes enacted prior to the time of separation of. the colonies
from the Mother Country in 1776 are included. within, the
English .common law. (See cases cited in 78 U.! of Pa'. L.
Rev. 195; 11 Am. Jur. 166; 22 L. R. A. 508, et seq.). .
[4] Appellants' contention that the present proceeding is
of a type unknown to the common ~aw courts because)t)if
an action in rem against the net itself rather than in personam
against the owners of the net is unsound. While it is true
that actions in common law courts are usually-;n personam
as contrasted to the in rem proceedings.of the~ourts of the
Admiralty, it has long been established that an action in rem
can be brought by the state in an ordinary common law court
for the forfeiture of goods or articles usedi:ri violation of
laws imposing such a penalty even though the articles thus
proceeded against are ships, appurtenances thereof, or car·
goes. The Statute of 12 Car. II., c. 18' (7 English Statutes
at Large), enacted in 1660 provided that all imports to and
exports from England and its possessions must be' in English
ships" under the penalty of the forfeiture and loss of all the
goods and commodities which shall. be imported,. into or exported out of any the aforesaid places in any other ship or
vessel, as also of the ship or vessel, with all its guns, furniture,
tackle, ammunition and apparel; one third· part. thereof to
his Majesty, his heirs and successors; one third part to the
governor of such land, plantation, island or territory where
such default shall be committed, in case the said ship or goods
be there seized, or otherwise that third part also to his
Majesty, his heirs and successors; and the other third part
to him or them who shall seize, inform or sue for tke same
In any court of record, by bill, information, plaint or other
action, wherein no essoin, protection or wager of law shall be
allowed. . . • ' , ( Italics added. ) This statute, providing
for the institution of forfeiture proceedings in any court of
record against ships and cargoes used in violation of the act
clearly authorized a remedy by forfeiture in the common law
courts. In the case of Roberts v. Withered (1696), 5 Mod.
193; 12 Mod. 92; 1 Salk. 223, it was held that in proceeding
to forfeit a ship and cargo under the above act, an action of
detinue would properly lie in the court of the King's Bench.
" • • . for my Lord Coke (b) was of the opinion, that the
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bringing a replevin is a claim in law, and that the property
is vested thereby in the plaintiff. So by navigating contrary
to the act, the property, is divested out of the former owners;
and by this action now brought, it is, vested in the plaintiff,
and therefore he may bring detinue for it. " This decision was
approved in Wilkins v. Despard, 5 Durnf. & East's Rep. 112.
Such forfeiture to the state of illegally used articles has
continued as an accepted common law procedure. The stat·
ute of 13 & 14 Car. II., c. 7, 11, 18, 20 (8 English Statutes
at Large), provided for the forfeiture in common law courts
or various articles used in violation or law, certain types of
vessels being included, in chapter 11. The Customs Consolidation Act of 1876 (39 & 40 Vict., c. 36) imposes, as part of
the penalty for smuggling, forfeiture to the Crown of the
goods smuggled and the ship, boat, carriage, or horse used
for their conveyance. Chapter 36, par. 218, of the act provides: "All duties, penalties, and forfeitures incurred under
or imposed by the Customs Acts . . . may be sued for,
prosecuted, determined, and recovered by action, information, or other appropriate proceeding in the High Court of
Justice in England, the superior courts of common law at
Dublin or Edinburgh . . . or by information in the name of
some officer of Customs or Excise, before one or more justice
or justices in the United Kingdom, the Isle of Man, or the
Channel Islands. . . . " (Italics added. ) ( See 9 Halsbury's Laws of England 377; Fra~1ey v. Charlton (1920), 1
K. B. 147.) While this statute is of recent origin, it indicates that at the present time in England forfeiture proceedings against vessels and cargo are instituted in common
law courts rather than courts of admiralty. (See also Dangerous Drugs Act, 1920, 10 & 11 Geo. 5, c. 46, s. 14 as
amended, 1923, 13 & 14 Geo. 5, c. 5, s. 2 (1); 22 Halsbury's
Laws of England 399.)
In the United States the federal government from early
times has provided for the forfeiture of certain articles used
in violation of law. (See 14 Stat. L. 156; 14 Stat. L. 151,
165; 13 Stat., L. 240; 14 Stat. L. 178; 12 Stat. L. 319; The
Sarah, 8 Wheat. 391. See also Internal Revenue Code, 26
U. S. C. A. secs. 2154, 2155 et seq., 3720 et seq.; 19 U. S. C .A.
sec. 1584.) California has likewise exacted forfeiture of various illegally used artiCles (Pen. Code, sec. 325 (1872);
Health and Safety Code, secs. 12304, 12305 [former Stats.

Oct: 1941.]

MOORE V. PURSE SEINE NET:
[18

c.

841'

(2d) 835]

1887, ch. 95, p. 110] ; Health and Safety Code, sec. 11610.),
The early federal statutes required that in the trial of cases
involving seizures made on waters navigable by vessels of ten
tons burden and upward the court sit as a court 'or admiralty
(see The Sarah, supra; Reynolds v. Steamboat Favorite,
supra, 193), but the federal cases themselves" recognize that
such forfeiture proceedings constituted a valid remedy
common law. ,Thus, in the case of The Palmyra, supra, Mr~
Justice Story stated: "It is well known that at the common
law, in, many cases of felonies, the party ,forfeited his goods
and chattels to the crown. . . . In the contemplation or the
common law, the offender's right was not divested until th'~
conviction. But this doctrine never was applled to seizures
and forfeitures, created by statute, in rem, cognizable on the
revenue side of the exchequer. The thing is here primarily
considered as the offender, or rather the offense is' attached
primarily to the thing."
(See United States v. Five Boxes
of Asafoetida, 181 Fed. 561; The Sarah, supra.) ,
There are cases which state that an in rem action against
a vessel is not a common law remedy and is therefore withiu
the exclusive admiralty jurisdiction of the federal courts.
(The Moses Taylor, supraj The Hine v. Trenor, 4 Wall.
'555 [18 L. Ed. 451] ; The Glide, 167 U. S. 606 [17 Sup. Ct.
932, .42 L. Ed. 296] ; The Belfast, .7 Wall. 624 [19 L. Ed~
266].) These cases, however, were concerned with types of.
in rem proceedings that were foreign to the common law.
They are authority for the rule that a state court can have
no jurisdiction over an action in rem against a vessel when
~uch action has no counterpart in the common law courts.
(See Knapp, Stout &; Co. v. McCaffrey, supra.) But thes~
cases are not controlling in circumstances :where , the common
law provided an analogous remedy. As 'stat'ed by the, Su;- .
preme Court of M:innesota in Reynolds v. Steamboat Favorite~
supra: "In England in the court of exchequer, and in ~the
United States in the district courts, in seizi;Lres made 'onl~nd
for violation of the revenue laws, the proceedings are: i1J-~e11l'~
;according to the course of the common law. ,Thoug~ a;;pro~
ee~ding is in rem, it is not necessarily a proceeding. 'o,~"eause
jn; admiralty. The Sarah, 8 Wheat. 391 ,[5 ~~. 'E'~~'<)64~-];
United: States v.422 Oasks of Win~" 1 Peters,~47 .[7'L.. E~
257] ;. 1 Kept Com. 374-5-,..6. "
., ' : ; , l i':!
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The courts of other jurisdictions with statutes similar in
nature to the one now under consideration have enforced
such forfeitures under the assumption that they had jurisdiction to do so. (See State v. Umaki, 103 Wash. 232 [174 Pac.
447]; State v. Mav rik as, 148 Wash. 651 [269 Pac. 805];
Sterrett v. Gibson, (Tex. Civ. App.) 168 S. W. 16, a:£I'd 172
S. W. 1198. See also Mirkovieh v. Milnor, 34 Fed. Supp.
409; leek v. Anderson, 57 Cal. 251 [40 Am. Rep. 115].) In
the case of The Bessie Mac, 21 Fed. Supp. 220, a federal
district court held that forfeiture proceedings under a Washington statute similar in nature to that of California were
maritime in nature and should therefore be brought in a
federal court. The court, however, failed to consider whether
such proceedings, though maritime, constituted a common law
remedy within the saving ,clause of the JUdiciary Act.
It is therefore clear that the forfeiture of illegally used
nets authorized by the Californ:a statute involves a traditional common law remedy cognizable in the state courts,
even though the statute was enacted long subsequent to the
Judiciary Act. (Red Gross Line v. Atlantic Fruit 00.,
supra.)
[5] Appellants contend that the petition for forfeiture
filed by the Fish and Game Commission did not allege that
the purse seine net in question was used for the taking of
fish and therefore failed to state a cause of action. The petition stated, however: "That said purse seine net . . . is
and was at all times herein menti{)ned an appliance used for
the taking of fish" and "was . . . used in violation of the
provisions of Section 842 of the Fish and Game Code of the
State of California." This constitutes a sufficient allegation
that the net was illegally used to catch fish.,
16] Since the judgment of forfeiture in the instant case
pronounced the net in question a public nuisance pursuant
to section 845 of the Fish and Game Code which declares
an.y net used in violation of law to be a public nuisance, the
action is one to abate a nuisance and therefore within the
appellate jurisdiction of the District Courts of Appeal. (Cal
Oonst., art. VI, sec. 4b.) Although the original appeal was
improperly transferred to this court by the District Court
of Appeal of the Second Appellate District, this court on
November 20th, 1939, transferred the cause to the District
Court of Appeal of the First Appellate District. The case
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is now here by virtue of an order granting a hearing after
decision by that court. This court therefore has jurisdiction
for all purposes. (Cal. Const., art. VI, sec. 4c.)
The judgment is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Curtis, J., and Carter, J., concurred.
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied' November
17, 1941. Edmonds, J., voted for a rehearing. '
.
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JOSEPH H. SMITH, Petitioner, 'V. INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT COMMISSION et al.,Respon1ents.
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[la-Ic] Workmen's Compensation-Compensable "Injuries-Going
to and Coming from Work-Exceptions to Rule-Roads Controlled by Employer.-The injuries sustained' by a .,laborer,
after checking out from work at the administration building
of an island exposition, when he jumped from the employer's
truck upon which he 'was riding to reach the ,ferry terminal
on his way home was compensable as arisingin the course ,of
his employment, where it was the, custom .pf,.employees to
ride the employer's trucks to the terminal after checking out
from work, where the injury was sustained when the employee
was leaving the administration office by the'most direct~route
and via the roads which were a part of theetliployer~s' premises and under its control, and where it was within contemplation of the employer that its employees would still be
in employment until they embarked upon the ferry boat.
[2] Id.-Compensable Injuries-Going to and .Comingfrom ,Work
- Transportation in Conveyance of Employer. - Generally,
when transportation is furnished by' an employer to convey
a workman to and from his place of work as 'an incident.u:!
1. Injury to employee while, being transported to and from
as arising in course of employment, note, 97 A. L. R. 555.
See also 27 Cal. Jur. 380.
' ,
MeR:. Dig. References: 1, 4, 5, 8. Workmen's Compensation,
§ 99; 2, 3. Workmen's Compensation, § 100; 6. Workmen's Compensation, § 155; 7. Highways, § 3; 9. Workmen's 'Compensation,
§ 117.
~ork
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